Saint Louis University Public Law Review
Volume 19
Number 1 Congress: Does It Abdicate Its
Power? (Vol. XIX, No. 1)

Article 8

2000

Congress-Supreme Court Relations: Strategies of Power
Steven Puro
Saint Louis University, lomperis@slu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Puro, Steven (2000) "Congress-Supreme Court Relations: Strategies of Power," Saint Louis University
Public Law Review: Vol. 19 : No. 1 , Article 8.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol19/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CONGRESS-SUPREME COURT RELATIONS: STRATEGIES OF
POWER

STEVEN PURO*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Whether Congress is yielding its constitutional powers is a central issue for
American political institutions at the end of the twentieth century. Scholars
who have closely examined Congress’s behavior ask both whether Congress
fully uses the powers and maximizes the institutional capacities it is entitled to
under separation of powers, and whether Congress can check the institutional
powers of other branches and defend individual rights more effectively than an
independent judiciary or judicial review. Congress is clearly active in shaping
social and political policies. In the American political system, Congress has
the important role of representation and supporting states or constituents in
their conflicts with the national government. Members of Congress may use
the process of representation to meet district and constituency needs rather than
expand Congress’s collective institutional capacity. Decentralization has been
a major trend in Congress in the last third of the twentieth century. Individual
members have increased their ability to support their own constituents in the
representative process, but may have decreased their ability to act
institutionally and compete with external institutions. Members often exhibit a
wide gulf between their use of institutional power and authority for individual
versus institutional beliefs.
Is Congress abdicating its power? An answer can focus on how Congress
defines its authority and role as a representative institution and whether
Congress mainly anticipates or responds and reacts to social and political
events. Fisher defines abdication as “to relinquish a right or power . . . giving
to someone else something that belongs to you” and argues that Congress has
failed to protect key legislative prerogatives.1 Congressional authority and
strategies for interaction with other branches in a separation of powers context

* Professor Political Science and Public Policy, Saint Louis University. B.A. Brooklyn College,
1964; M.A. and Ph.D. State University of New York at Buffalo, 1967 and 1971. I appreciate
Leah Puro’s comments on this article.
1. Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 931, 932 (1999).
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are undermined by abdication. Williams addresses these issues using public
choice analysis and suggests differences between institutional and individual
strategies within Congress. 2 He notes there is an important distinction
between congressional abdication and congressional delegation, and that line is
currently blurred.3 Williams argues Congressional abdication concerning
Executive War Powers is “not one of power, but of political responsibility.”4
Congress’s relationship with the federal judiciary is an important aspect of
its authority. Congress and the Supreme Court consider many issues of
defining constitutional boundaries through statutory and constitutional
interpretation. Congressional legislation is often central to the definition of
boundaries of power and authority for various national and state governing
units, and the federal courts often hear cases concerning redefined government
authority. This article will examine Congress-Supreme Court relationships and
strategies of exercising power in the federal system.
II. CONGRESSIONAL-JUDICIARY RELATIONSHIPS
The patterns of congressional relations with the federal judiciary are
complex and dynamic. Congress has a variety of constitutional means to
control and influence judicial processes and decisions. Congress has control
within constitutionally set boundaries over the jurisdiction of federal courts,
the budget of the Supreme Court, and the Court’s appellate jurisdiction by
removing certain topics.5 Congress may also pass statutes that revise Supreme
Court decisions or minimize the impact of Court rulings. The Supreme Court
can interpret Congress’s override and may alter the legislation in whole6 or in
part.7 Congress and the Court can interact in more than one round of statutory
interpretation and reinterpretation. In a recent visible example, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act,8 the Court and Congress modified each other’s
behavior through new decisions and succeeding legislation.
Congress-Court relations are important in maintaining a working
republican government. Both Congress and the Supreme Court have key roles

2. Douglas R. Williams, Demonstrating and Explaining Congressional Abdication: Why
Does Congress Abdicate Power?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1013 (1999).
3. Id. at 1032.
4. Id. Later, he reminds us about “the possibility that congressional power may present a
situation in which the benefits to individual legislators of a collective decision not to abdicate war
powers may outweigh the costs to the legislator of such actions, and yet such a desirable
collective outcome will not come about.” Id. at 1040.
5. See generally U.S. CONST.
6. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (discussing the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)).
7. See Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211
(1995).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

CONGRESS-SUPREME COURT RELATIONS

119

in preserving the balance of authority within the federal government and
stabilizing the balance of authority between the federal government and the
states. Both statutory and constitutional policies afford frequent opportunities
for Congress-Court interactions; scholars have found that the Court and
Congress mainly accept each other’s interpretations and avoid serious
institutional conflict. Segal’s separation of powers analysis “demonstrates that
the Court must be concerned with the preferences of Congress (and
occasionally the President) if it wishes to be an effective policymaker.”9
Ferejohn and Weingast examine Congress’s “capacity to react” as a
fundamental feature of the political process. 10
Congress has substantial latitude to support or undermine the
implementation of Court policies. David O’Brien argues that “Congress
indubitably has the power to delay and undercut implementation of the Court’s
rulings. On major issues of public policy, Congress is likely to prevail or, at
least, temper the impact of the Court’s Rulings.”11 Congress’s major
responsibilities include translating and implementing policies which result
from its right to decide what resources will be used, how and where. As an
example of modifying a Supreme Court policy, Congress passed laws, such as
the Hyde Amendment, that limit funding for and participation of federal
agencies in providing therapeutic and elective abortions. Congressional power
to translate policy into action may be extended and given additional legitimacy
when the Supreme Court supports Congress’s decisions. If the Court opposes
Congress’s decisions, Congress may have less latitude to act and constituency
groups may mobilize long-term political actions based on competing policy
definitions.
Eskridge generally finds a moderate frequency for Congress overriding
statutory decisions by the Court.12 In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress passed
major legislation by means of omnibus bills, which avoided conflicts between
legislators that would prevent the passage of individual acts.13 A single
omnibus bill can overturn several Supreme Court decisions.14 For instance, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned twelve Supreme Court rulings, especially
those concerning standards for employer and employee responsibility to prove

9. Jeffrey Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and
Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (Mar. 1997).
10. John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 263 (1992).
11. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 191 (2000).
12. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 331-455 (1991).
13. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 120 (1997) (arguing that
scholarly analysis of overrides of statutory decisions is at an early stage).
14. Id.
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discrimination in hiring.15 Conflicts between the Court and Congress
occasionally become constitutional or statutory crises.16 The issue of whether
Congress abdicates power becomes more prominent during and after major
conflicts between branches such as New Deal policies in the 1930’s, 17 civil
liberties in the 1950’s,18 school prayer in the 1960’s,19 abortion rights in the
1970’s and 1980’s,20 and Congressional attempts to control executive officials
in the 1980’s and 1990’s.21
The Constitution gives Congress authority to remove the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction for certain types of cases.22 Threats by Congress to remove
jurisdiction attract the attention of both the Court and constituents to a variety
of socially volatile issues such as school prayer, reproductive rights and
abortion, criminals’ rights, and minority groups’ rights. Congress rarely
removes jurisdiction because of actual and potential negative consequences to
this exercise of power. First, denial of jurisdiction by Congress establishes as
permanent precedent the very Supreme Court rulings that Congress wishes to
negate. David O’Brien finds a paradox in Court-curbing legislation: Congress
denies Court review on major issues of public law and policy that Congress
originally gave the Court the power to decide and place on its agenda.23
Second, removal of jurisdiction by Congress renders the future development of
the law uncertain. More directed strategies, such as statutory reinterpretation
and nonstatutory administrative practices, are available to Congress to reverse
or modify Supreme Court rulings. Third, direct confrontation between
Congress and the Court may create a full-scale constitutional conflict.24
Congressional authority in a wide range of policies and legal matters can be
potentially diminished by such a conflict.
Congress can use both legislation and rule making to guide the Supreme
Court. Congress encourages judicial interpretation by writing broad laws in
major social and political areas.25 When cases based on these laws are brought
15. Id.
16. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508.
17. See Abner J. Mikva & Jeff Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV.
729 (1991).
18. See generally Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the District of
Columbia Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 323-24 (1988).
19. See BAUM, supra note 13.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.
23. See O’BRIEN, supra note 11, at 190.
24. See, e.g., Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869) (Congress removed the Court’s
jurisdiction over certain denials of writs of habeas corpus.).
25. See Mikva & Bleich, supra note 17; CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE
LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1988) (discussing the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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before the Supreme Court, scholarly analysis shows that the Court anticipates
Congress’s intent.26 However, with the growth of national interest groups over
the last few decades, many of which use litigation as a policy vehicle, a
significant amount of Congress’s major legislation depends on the Court’s and
other organizations’ acceptance.
III. CONGRESS-COURT STRATEGIES: ADVANCING POLICY GOALS
Congress may choose to advance its policy goals by developing
institutional agendas that allow details of major social and economic
legislation to be deduced by the federal court, since both Congress and the
Court use law as an institutional boundary. Congress and its leaders can
anticipate the preferences of the Court or individual Justices since these
preferences can be constrained by legal doctrine. 27 Congress often assumes
that both branches can support existing policies. This strategic behavior takes
into account that Congress can reinterpret Supreme Court rulings if they are
substantially different from Congress’ statutory policy goals. Patterns of
cooperation and conflict between Congress and Court vary across time periods
and issues, such as administrative rule making.28 Eskridge found that between
1967 and 1991 Congress overrode 121 Supreme Court statutory decisions and
220 lower court decisions. 29
Both Baum30 and Segal31 have formulated models of Justices’ strategic
behavior to avoid legislative reversal of statutory decisions. Epstein and
Knight use Justices’ docket books and papers to demonstrate their concern
with legislative reversal.32
Congress’s representational role involves adjustment to policy
developments. Broad Congressional delegation of authority to administrative
agencies creates constitutional ambiguity and opportunities for policy change,
and leads to court and executive branch interpretations. Congressional reliance
on narrowly drawn authority to administrative agencies would require
legislators to regularly decide rules and administrative practices. In the last
two decades, an important part of Congress’s representational role has been to
make good policy and not administer specific policies.
It is difficult to analyze whether, when deciding congressional statutes,
Justices consider the preferences of the current Congress or the Congress that
passed the law. How do Justices compare these two sets of congressional
26. See BAUM, supra note 13.
27. See Eskridge, supra note 12.
28. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (Court
argues that agencies’ interpretation of ambiguous statutory language should be followed).
29. Eskridge, supra note 12.
30. See BAUM, supra note 13.
31. See Segal, supra note 9.
32. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 149-50 (1998).
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preferences?33 Justices can form expectations, such as the expectation that
Congress will more credibly reverse statutory than constitutional decisions,
connected to interaction patterns with Congress and the risk of congressional
reversal. Frank Cross indicates a difficulty in using the Court’s assessment of
the risk of congressional reversal, “[i]n a statutory interpretation action, the law
dictates that Congress enforce the intent of the enacting Congress, which
obviously requires consideration of legislative preferences but has little to do
with the risk of reversal, which involves the preferences of the
contemporaneous Congress.”34
Miscalculations in Justices’ forecasting of Congress’s preferences and
likely outcomes may lead Congress to modify or reverse Supreme Court
statutory decisions by legislations. Predicting the actions of Congress is
difficult because it is multilayered and complex, and its behavior patterns
within and between chambers are intricate. Legal and policy issues are not
completely definable as statutory or constitutional. Both the Court and
Congress can bundle or manipulate issues to protect their decisions both
constitutionally and from the other branch’s changes. Knowledge of strategic
interactions between the Court and Congress would be advanced by further
analysis of Congress’s ability to set boundaries on decision making for the
Supreme Court and lower federal courts.
In both positive political theory and attitudinalist models, scholars agree
that Supreme Court Justices take strategic actions to avoid negative responses
by Congress, especially regular reversal or reversals in major cases.35 Positive
political theorists emphasize that the Court protects its preferred policies by
deferring to Congress’s preferences, especially in statutory cases.36 Attitudinal
theorists do not see as many constraints from Congress or the President on
Justices’ votes.37 As noted earlier, Congressional achievement of legislative
outcomes may require cooperation through Supreme Court decisions. In any
given case, Congress cannot be assured of Court cooperation. However, in a
series of cases, Congress may have strong expectations that Court behavior
will be compliant with Congressional decisions. Few instances exist where the
opposite pattern occurs, where Congress has strong expectations that Court
decisions will oppose Congressional decisions.38

33. See R. Gelly & P. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory
Decisions, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263 (1990).
34. Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 527 (1999) (reviewing
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 32).
35. BAUM, supra note 13, at 94.
36. Segal, supra note 9, at 26.
37. Id. at 33.
38. See Mikva & Bleich, supra note 17, e.g. Congress-Court decisions concerning New Deal
legislation between 1932-1936.
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It is worthwhile to briefly examine Supreme Court voting patterns to avoid
reversal by Congress. It is frequently argued that the risk of congressional
reversal is reduced by Supreme Court unanimity, such as in Brown v. Board of
Education39 and U.S. v. Nixon.40 But scholarly analysis has not determined
how much the risk of reversal is reduced by either unanimity or smaller
majorities from eight to five votes.41 For example, how much did the 6-3 vote
for Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith,42 in which Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, influence the near
unanimous vote by both House and Senate on the religious Freedom
Restoration Act,43 which overruled that decision? Knowledge of how an
individual Justice’s vote or how the Court’s voting patterns function as a signal
to Congress and its leaders would give this question a clearer answer in terms
of authority and interactions between Congress and the Court.
Fisher argues that Congress may turn to federal courts to challenge the
President’s activities and delay an immediate confrontation between the
President and Congress. He questions this approach: “[o]ne of the byproducts of the War Powers Resolution has been the tendency of legislators to
turn not to their colleagues to challenge the President but rather to the
courts.”44 Fisher notes that Congress was uncertain about the constitutionality
of the provisions of the Line Item Veto Act of 199645 and provided “a
procedure allowing for expedited review in the courts for challenges that the
statute violated the Constitution” to resolve its concerns.46 Senator Byrd (DWV) called this action “a punt to the courts” which allows federal courts to
determine the meaning and structure of Congress’s legislation.47 It is difficult
for a Congress uncertain about major constitutional legislation to protect its
own prerogatives and develop a collective preference or strategy.
Congress and the Court entered into a major conflict over the Line Item
Veto Act. Congress’s short-run political calculations and readiness to
relinquish authority made it more difficult in the long run for the Court to
defend Congress’s authority. Congress could be seen here as yielding power to
the federal courts and allowing them to determine where authority lies within
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
41. Gelly & Spiller, supra note 33, at 556. Epstein and Segal’s initial findings provide
“some support for the hypothesis that larger majorities have greater political power in the external
environment. They also found that more ideologically homogeneous Courts that could command
larger majorities were less responsive to the risk of reversal from an ideologically contrary
Congress.” Id. at n.245
42. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
43. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507.
44. Fisher, supra note 1, at 968.
45. Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996).
46. Fisher, supra note 1, at 1003.
47. Id.
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the federal system; if similar actions continue, institutional values and the
institution of Congress may be endangered. Twelve years earlier, in Bowsher
v. Synar,48 the Supreme Court overturned the 1985 Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act,49 in which Congress sought to expand
authority over the budgetary process. Congress attempted to perform an
executive function by claiming for itself control over the United States
Comptroller General’s removal and provisions of the Act that gave it
responsibility to enforce and execute laws.50 The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act presents another Congress-Court conflict; the Court believes
that deciding the issues of this Act belongs to its authority.51
Canon and Johnson52 indicate that the Court will sometimes invite
Congress to rewrite a statute to overturn the Court’s decision.53 Spiller and
Tiller, who use control over policy and legal rules to model Congress-Court
interactions, argue that Congress is more likely to override Court decisions
based on policy grounds than on legal rules. 54 In a Court-centered view, the
judiciary uses Congress’s preferences and institutional structures to achieve its
own policy ends.55 Spiller and Tiller challenge previous models which give
Congress and other institutions limited attention in explaining Justices’ votes
and decision making by the Court.56 They show that “it can be perfectly
rational for the Court to look for a legislative override; indeed, it sometimes
openly invites such a legislative response.”57 With the shrinking Supreme
Court docket, Congress has followed a strategy of overriding lower federal
court statutory interpretations to establish its policies.
The 1950s and 1980s featured statutory and constitutional conflict between
the Court and Congress. In general, Congress and the Court had different
ideological positions on many issues, including government actions against
persons accused of subversive activities and the scope of civil rights laws.
Congress established an institutional voice that regularly reversed Supreme
Court decisions. To give examples, in the late 1950s Congress authorized a
more conservative interpretation of suspected individuals’ rights against
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

478 U.S. 714 (1986).
2 U.S.C. § 901 (1985).
See Bowsher, 487 U.S. at 717.
See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 509.
See generally BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES:
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (2d ed. 1999).
53. Id. at 148 n. 2. See, e.g, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95
(1978); McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 236 (1981); Dept. of Defense v. Federal Labor
Relations Authority, 510 U.S. 487, 490-94 (1994).
54. Pablo G. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals
of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 503, 521(1996).
55. Id. at 514.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 521.
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government investigations.
The Supreme Court recognized this
interpretation’s stability and certainty by reversing some of its earlier rulings
and restoring investigative power to Congress.58
In the 1980s, Congress, which opposed conservative Court decisions
narrowing the scope of civil rights and liberties, passed legislation to broaden
civil rights protections, especially those of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. For
example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 established that programs
receiving federal funds could not discriminate based on race or national origin
and that federal funding could be terminated if the programs discriminated. In
Grove City College v. Bell59 the Court, agreeing with the Reagan
Administration, narrowed the statute’s application to specific programs only,
not the entire institution, in a case technically involving Title IX of the Federal
Education Act of 1972.60 Congress overturned this ruling in the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987.61
Congress’s willingness to rewrite legislation that has been overturned by
the Supreme Court has been limited by divisions within Congress and the
constitutional or legislative interpretations of key committee members. Canon
and Johnson argue that the Court can make lasting policy interpretations more
easily when Congress has sharply divided policy preferences.62 But when there
are solid coalitions opposing the Court in Congress, Congress can enforce its
preferences against the Court’s.63
A serious conflict arose between Congress and the Court over the First
Amendment importance of the United States flag. The Flag Protection Act of
198964 overrode Texas v. Johnson65 and was itself overridden by U.S. v.
Eichmann.66 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act currently poses a
substantial conflict between positions strongly held by both Congress and the
Court. Serious conflicts between Congress and the Supreme Court have often
been modified by long-term events, such as changes in the Court or Congress’s
membership. Two major exceptions, extending across the last generation of
Congress-Court relationships, have been reproductive rights and racial
equality/desegregation.

58. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 108 (1959) (overruling Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)).
59. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
60. See id. at 558-560.
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1987).
62. CANON AND JOHNSON, supra note 32, at 198.
63. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (establishing a uniform voting age of 18 for
federal elections and overruling Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1989).
65. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
66. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
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Cross argues that “Court decisions do not automatically actualize the
Court’s policies and the impact of Court opinions may depend upon the
compliance of Congress or other external actors.”67 The Supreme Court can
encourage other institutions to comply with its decisions, and Justices often
assume that noncompliance is more likely for decisions with broader scope.
Additional legislation, regulation, or appropriations by Congress play an
important role in achieving compliance by society with the Court’s decisions.
Congress may achieve additional authority through reinterpreting Court
decisions. The judiciary is often faced with deciding between the authority of
Congress and the President. In the last decade, on many important domestic
and international matters the judiciary’s constitutional and statutory
interpretations appear to shift power from Congress to the President. By
expanding presidential authority and limiting Congress’s authority, are federal
courts involved in forming a more compact constitutional structure?
IV. CONCLUSION
The American system of government shares the power and responsibility
of constitutional interpretation among the executive, legislative and judicial
branches. The constitutional and statutory relationships among these three
branches are guided by both short- and long-term considerations. In a given
year or over the course of several years, Congress’s authority is concerned in a
wide range of constitutional and statutory issues before Congress and the
Supreme Court. Congress-Supreme Court relationships involve multiple
strategies which encourage consensus and coalition building among them
rather than conflict. Conflicts occur due to different ideological positions,
varying interpretations of specific constitutional and statutory provisions, and
central questions about the scope of constitutional authority.
Congress’s institutional competence in dealing with the courts and the
executive will affect its attempts to maximize institutional capacity in relations
with the Supreme Court. Congress may convey its institutional authority
through statutory language, setting institutional boundaries for Supreme Court
interpretation of statutes and regulations, and threatening increased
jurisdictional or budgetary controls over federal courts. No determinative set
of criteria for Congressional limitation on Court decisions was found. Such
criteria should not be expected since Congress has given the Supreme Court
power to set its own agenda and decide major constitutional and statutory
matters. It would be difficult for Congress to use long-term institutional
strategies in specific cases to fully exercise its institutional powers and
abilities. Congress has increasingly received its expected payoffs from short-

67. Cross, supra note 34, at 525.
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term reactions to Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s and 1990s, with
divided governments as the national norm.
The majority of scholars working on Congress-Court relationships
consider short-term strategies; additional scholarship is necessary to study
interactions based on long-term strategies. A main question for further
investigation is how Supreme Court Justices and leaders in Congress build and
stabilize institutional relationships in the area of statutory and constitutional
interpretation. Since policy and legal boundaries between Congress and Court
may change over time, long-term strategic practices need to be discussed and
analyzed.
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